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CIVIL PROCEDURE- OINDER OF STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION WITH COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENT PARTIES DEFENDANT-

Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for injuries received in an
automobile accident caused by defendant's negligence in driving while
intoxicated. She sought to join with this claim actions against several bar
owners under a statute providing for liability of bar owners for injuries
caused by one to whom they had unlawfully sold alcoholic beverages.1 One
of the defendant bar owners moved to dismiss for misjoinder or to compel
an election of causes on the ground that since only compensatory damages
could be recovered against the defendant-consumer upon common law negligence, and both exemplary and compensatory damages could be recovered against the bar owners under the statutory cause, it would be impossible for the court properly to instruct the jury without confusing them as
to the issues, with resulting prejudice to the bar owners. Held, joinder
allowed. The Michigan joinder provision provides for joinder of causes
and multiple defendants when the liability is one asserted against all of
the defendants or sufficient grounds shall appear for uniting the causes of
action " ... in order to promote the convenient administration of justice."2
It would be unjust to force a plaintiff under these circumstances to choose
her target from among the defendants, all of whom in violation of the
law contributed to her injuries. Since the court could direct the jury to
bring in separate verdicts on the different causes, this joinder would not
prejudice the defendant. 3 Ruediger v. Klink, (Mich. 1956) 78 N.W. (2d)

248.
The twentieth century trend in joinder has emphasized free joinder
guided by principles of trial convenience.4 The wording of the Michigan
joinder provision is probably the broadest in use at this time.5 It places
no limit upon joinder except that of trial convenience. Because of this

Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Mason's Supp. 1954) §436.22.
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §608.1.
s Michigan Court Rule 37, §7, originally rule 70, adopted in Lewis v. Bricker, 232
Mich. 388, 205 N.W. 98 (1925). The court stated that the joinder statute necessarily carried with it authority to direct separate verdicts and to enter separate judgments, and
the purpose of this rule was merely to clarify and make certain the practice under the
statute.
4 See 37 CoL. L. REv. 462 (1937); 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 1803-1807 (1948).
5 Fla. Stat. (1943) §46.08, is very similar to the Michigan provision.
1
2
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broadness, however, there is no concrete test which can be applied in each
case.,- Each case must be decided on its own merits so that the final test is a
weighing of the convenience of the party seeking the joinder and that of
the party seeking dismissal or an election.6 The first cases under the Michigan joinder statute seemed either to ignore it or to hold that it was meant
only to allow joinder where it would have been allowed at common law.1
Application of the rules set forth in most of these early cases to the principal case probably would have resulted in a holding of misjoinder. 8 Since
these decisions, however, the federal joinder provisions have been adopted
for federal courts and many states have adopted provisions with substantially similar wording.9 The federal rules place no limitation on joinder of
causes so long as the requisites for joinder of parties are met.10 The rule
for permissive joinder of defendants provides that they may be joined
where the right to relief arises out of the "same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences" and if any common question of law or
fact is involved.11 Here the right to relief would in each case arise out of
the accident12 and several common questions of fact would have to be
proved in each case.13 It is very possible, as the court stated in Otto v. Village of Highland Park,14 that at the time the Michigan joinder provision was
6 "The propriety of consolidation [allowed by statute whenever joinder would be
possible] is to be determined entirely by the state of facts existing prior to the consolidation." Higdon v. Kelley, 339 Mich. 209 at 222, 63 N.W. (2d) 592 (1954).
7 See McDonald v. Hall, 193 Mich. 50, 159 N.W. 358 (1916); Albrecht v. Benevolent
Society, 205 Mich. 395, 171 N.W. 461 (1919); Thomson v. Kent Circuit Judge, 230 Mich.
354, 203 N.W. 108 (1925); Brewster Loud Lumber Co. v. General Builders' Supply Co., 233
Mich. 633, 208 N.W. 28 (1926). For many years the leading case on the Michigan statute
was Otto v. Village of Highland Park, 204 Mich. 74 at 81, 169 N.W. 904 (1918), in which
the court held, "While its [the Michigan joinder statute's] provisions as to joinder of
actions and parties are broad in terms .•. , it was not the legislative intent to ignore the
fundamental principles of procedure to the extent proposed in this declaration where, as
plaintiffs sound their counts, it is sought to join in a single action and have determined
the liability of alleged independent tort-feasors for different and distinct torts charged to
each, without concert of action or community of responsibility, inevitably amounting to
both a joinder of parties severally liable and a joinder of different causes of action, each
against a different defendant."
s See quoted section of decision in Otto v. Village of Highland Park, note 7 supra.
9 See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, §§24 and 44; Cahill-Parsons New York Civil Practice,
2d ed., §§212 and 258 (1955); 2 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, rev. ed., (Waltzinger, 1954) §§4:31-1
and 4:33-1.
10 Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 18 (a).
11 Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 20.
12 Baker v. Healy, 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E. (2d) 228 (1939), quoting (at 644-645) Van
Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620 at 623-624: "A 'transaction' is something which has taken
place, whereby a cause of action has arisen. It must therefore consist of an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more
than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between
themselves are altered."
13 For a comparison of the formerly narrow application of the Michigan joinder provision with application of rule 20 of the federal rules to very similar facts, see Roberts v.
Fox, 306 Mich. 279, 10 N.W. (2d) 857 (1943) and Olan Mills of Tennessee v. Enterprise
Pub. Co., (5th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 895.
14 Note 7 supra.
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first passed (1915) the legislature did not intend it to be as broad as its
terms. However, the court in the principal case has stated that since "the
rule [section 7 of rule 37] and ... statutes are unitedly designed to promote the convenient administration of justice . . . we see no reason for
tightening their broad and wholesome purposes in this or like case."1 5 If
this can be taken to mean that now the statute is to be broadly interpreted
in favor of joinder, it is probable that joinder will be allowed at least as
often under Michigan's broad but ambiguous test as it is under rule 20 of
the federal rules. It is certainly clear that the court has now rejected the
prejudice against liberal joinder which was evident in the earlier cases.

George W. Marti

15 Principal

case at 253.

